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What role do social networks play in determining migrant labor market outcomes? We 
examine this question using data from a random sample of 1500 immigrants living in Ireland. 
We propose a theoretical model formally predicting that immigrants with more contacts have 
additional access to job offers, and are therefore better able to become employed and choose 
higher paid jobs. Our empirical analysis confirms these findings, while focusing more 
generally on the relationship between migrants’ social networks and a variety of labor market 
outcomes (namely wages, employment, occupational choice and job security), contrary to the 
literature. We find evidence that having one more contact in the network is associated with an 
increase of 11pp in the probability of being employed and with an increase of about 100 euros 
in the average salary. However, our data is not suggestive of a network size effect on 
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The study of social networks emerged in the economics literature as a way to explain 
information mismatches and other market frictions. Early empirical studies show that about 
half of employed individuals rely on family and friends to find jobs or to have access to job 
information (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; Addison and Portugal, 2001). The main theoretical 
hypothesis linking social networks to labor market outcomes proposes the existence of an 
informal channel, usually formed by relatives, friends and acquaintances, that provides 
individuals information not available through formal sources. Such channel mitigates job 
search frictions in two distinct ways: by making available information to job seekers about 
employment opportunities, while also providing employers references about the workers.  
In the recent decades, a growing literature has investigated the role of social networks on 
migrant outcomes. In one of its most prominent findings, migrants tend to cluster in groups 
and share information among them (see Edin et al, 2003 and Munshi, 2003), which illustrates 
the particular importance of social networks for migration. Being newcomers to the labor 
market, migrants are in need of information about job openings and the characteristics of the 
labor market, particularly upon arrival to the host country. On the other hand, networks may 
also be useful from the perspective of the employer who often lacks information about the 
newly arrived migrants.  
Despite the expectable importance of social networks on migrant labor market outcomes, 
there is still a lack of robust empirical evidence on this research question. This paper attempts 
to fill this gap by using a random sample of 1500 immigrants from 110 different nations 
residing in Ireland in 2010. We use detailed survey data for migrants and their contacts, which 
enables us to measure the social network for each migrant, and to find in this way empirical 
evidence linking networks to the labor market outcomes of immigrants. The core hypothesis 
of this study is that, immigrants with larger networks are more exposed to information and 
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therefore are more likely to be employed and to hold higher paid jobs. We also analyze other 
labor market outcomes such as occupational choice and job security (meaning the job stability 
offered by the type of job contract). 
Our paper contributes to the previous literature by studying the role of migrant networks 
at various dimensions of labor market integration. We examine three main questions: (i) is the 
probability of being employed higher for individuals with more contacts; (ii) what is the 
causal effect of the network size on subsequent wages: do immigrants with larger networks 
have higher wages; (iii) is there a selection process with the choice of working among 
immigrants.  
Identification of the causal effects of network size on migrant outcomes is complicated by 
the possibility of several endogeneity problems. First, the suspected causal relationship 
between the migrant network size and the respective labor market outcome can be 
simultaneously determined by unobservable characteristics. Second, endogeneity can also 
occur through a selection process that leads some immigrants to choose to participate in the 
labor market while others do not – which results in a sample selection problem in that it is not 
possible to observe the wages of those who do not work. In order to tackle these possible 
estimation biases, and to ensure the robustness of our results we estimate several distinct 
models: Linear Probability Model (LPM), Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), Heckit model 
and IV-Heckit model. 
We find evidence that immigrants with a larger network size are more likely to be 
employed and earn higher salaries. Moreover, our empirical analysis confirms that there is, in 
fact, a self-selection process influencing the decision of work. However, our data indicates 
that network size does not seem to influence occupational choice or the job security of 
immigrants. Our results are in line with the previous findings in the literature related to wages 
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and employment. The impact of the network size on the occupation and job security are new 
findings to the literature.  
 The structure of the remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
main results found in the literature. Section 3 shows a theoretical framework to model the 
impact of the network size on the employment and wages of immigrants. Section 4 describes 
the methodology used and the identification issues. Section 5 presents the data used and the 
descriptive statistics. Finally, Section 6 includes the empirical results and section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
 
This section presents a systematic analysis of the previous findings on the topic and 
relates the past literature with our empirical strategy. We summarize the impact of social 
networks both on migration and on labor market outcomes. 
As initially proposed by Sjaastad (1962) and Harris and Todaro (1970), migration is often 
an uncertain and risky investment. However, migration networks can lower the costs and 
uncertainty of follower migrants, as verified by McKenzie and Rapoport (2010). Umblijs 
(2012) presents theoretical and empirical evidence that if potential migrants have access to a 
network at the destination, more risk-averse migrants will migrate than if they had no access 
to these networks1. 
Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2005) were one of the first authors to put forward a 
theoretical model of the role of networks on labor market outcomes particularly wages and 
employment. The model accounts for a job-matching process, in which workers find jobs 
through their social network, and shows that in the steady-state, labor market outcomes are 
positively correlated across time and across agents within a network. Nonetheless, it assumes 
that networks are exogenous, a strong assumption that has not been validated by empirical 
research (a few examples include Munshi, 2003 and An, 2015).  
                                                          
1 For further evidence of the importance of social networks for migration, see: Beine et al. (2011), Batista and 
Umblijs (2014), Batista and Umblijs (2016), Batista et. al (2016). 
4 
 
Later, Wahba and Zenou (2005) extended the model of Calvo-Armengol and Zenou 
(2005) by differentiating between low- and high-educated individuals and comparing the 
efficiency of using networks to find a job with other search methods. The underlying 
assumption made by the authors is that low-educated individuals only use informal job search 
methods to find a job, while high-educated individuals use both formal and informal methods. 
Considering population density as a proxy for the size of the network in Egypt, they provide 
empirical evidence that conditional on being employed, the probability of finding a job 
through friends and relatives, compared to other search methods, is higher in denser areas 
than in less denser areas. 
Given the importance of networks as an informal institution with consequences in the 
labor market, one would expect its effect to be stronger among migrants (relative to natives) 
as they are newcomers to the market. Munshi (2003) argues that both migrants and employers 
at the destination lack full access to information about each other, reason why they are in need 
of job referrals. Social networks have the role of decreasing the asymmetry of information 
between both agents. Using a sample of Mexican migrants in the US, the study finds that 
migrants with larger networks are more likely to be employed and hold higher paying jobs 
upon arrival. Also, Chen (2009) uses the proportion of labor migrants in the home village as 
an indicator of the village social network to study the effects of internal migration in China 
and finds that larger networks are associated with higher wages. Recently, Kerr and Mandorff 
(2015) provide evidence that immigrants in the US tend to cluster in the same occupations as 
immigrants from the same nationality. A result verified by Patel and Vella (2007) that find 
additional evidence of a wage premium for those immigrants who choose to work in the most 
popular occupations of their networks due to possible market power among these groups.  
Although the correlation between networks and higher wages may seem intuitive, some 
other studies have pointed to an opposite direction. For instance, Datcher Loury (2006) and 
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Long et. al (2013) find evidence of a wage penalty among those individuals who use networks 
to find jobs over other search methods. Their view rests on the assumption that workers who 
do not obtain better job offers through formal channels use networks to find jobs as a last 
resort. For that reason, network users will hold lower paid jobs compared to non-users. 
In our paper, we will further explore the effects of networks in the labor market using a 
sample of international migrants living in Ireland. By controlling for a variety of individual 
characteristics, and addressing potential endogeneity problems, we are able to provide novel 
insight on this issue. Contrary to the existing literature, our main definition of networks is not 
only based on geographical proximity or place of origin. Our measure of networks includes 
non-migrants and migrants from the same country, but also from different countries. In spite 
of the great importance of migrant communities, it is plausible that they also share and are 
provided with information about the labor market by other residents. This approach is even 
more pertinent in the context of Ireland as migrants come from a variety of countries 
(including highly developed and developing economies), mostly work in high-skilled jobs and 
are, on average, highly educated2. 
3. Theoretical Model 
In order to frame our research, we propose an immigrant’s search behavior model, adapted 
from Patel and Vella (2007), to study the theoretical mechanisms linking networks to wages 
and employment.   
Job search  is  made  using  formal  and  informal  methods,  where  the  latter  refers  to  
the  individual network of employed friends and relatives. The model assumes a continuous 
time framework in which job offers can arrive from either formal or informal channels 
following a Poisson process and that immigrants, after arriving to a new country, seek to 
maximize the expected value of discounted future income using discount rate 𝑟. Individuals 
                                                          





receive job offers through the formal channel with arrival rate 𝑝, and from the informal 
channel with arrival rate  𝑝𝑁. As long as the immigrant does not participate in the labor 
market, he receives compensation 𝑏, which can be interpreted as leisure or a different type of 
compensation. Wages offered through the formal channel are represented by 𝑤 and have 
distribution 𝐹(𝑤), while wages offered through the network channel are represented by 
𝑤𝑁 and have distribution 𝐹𝑁(𝑤𝑁). The model assumes that, as long as the migrant finds a job 
with wage 𝑤 or 𝑤𝑁, he will keep it forever. The value of working in a job found through the 
formal channel and the informal channel is, 𝑊(𝑤) =  𝑤
𝑟
 and 𝑊(𝑤𝑁) =  
𝑤𝑁
𝑟
, respectively.  
Thus, the flow value of being unemployed, 𝑟𝑈, is: 
      𝑟𝑈 = 𝑏 + 𝑝 ∫ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 [𝑊(𝑤) − 𝑈, 0]𝑑𝐹(𝑤) + 𝑝𝑁 ∫ max  [𝑊(𝑤𝑁) − 𝑈, 0]𝑑𝐹𝑁(𝑤𝑁)        (1) 
The first term on the right-hand side of the equation, 𝑏,  stands for  the  instantaneous 
payoff of being unemployed, while the second and the third terms represent the expected 
value from being employed in a job found via the formal and network channels respectively. 
The decision of entering the labor market is made when the individual finds a job offer with 
wage realization 𝑤 or 𝑤𝑁  in which the value of being employed, (𝑤) or (𝑤𝑁) is higher than 
the value of not entering the labor market, U.   
The larger the network size, the more job offers a given individual will receive through 
the informal channel. Assuming that the number of people in the network is given by 𝑛 and 
that the arrival job rate 𝑝 is constant among all individuals in the network, 𝑝𝑁 is expressed by: 
𝑝𝑁 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑖∈𝑛
= 𝑛𝑝 
The  individual  will  accept  the  job  offer  if  𝑤 is  at  least  as  large  as  the  reservation 
wage, 𝑤𝑅. The reservation wage is solved by W(𝑤𝑅) = 𝑈.  Noting that 𝑟𝑈 = 𝑤𝑅 and 𝑊 −
𝑈 = 𝑤−𝑤𝑅
𝑟






𝑤𝑅 = 𝑏 +   𝑝 ∫
𝑤 − 𝑤𝑅
𝑟𝑤𝑅




Integrating (3) by parts, yields: 
𝑤𝑅 = 𝑏 +
1
𝑟
 𝑝 ∫ [1 − 𝐹(𝑤)]
𝑤𝑅
𝑑𝑤 +  
1
𝑟
𝑝𝑁 ∫ [1 − 𝐹𝑁(𝑤𝑁)]
𝑤𝑅
𝑑𝑤𝑁 
Our model proposes two main testable implications.  First, equation (2) shows that the 
arrival rate of job offers is positively correlated with the number of people in the network. 
This result is derived from the overall arrival rate of a job offer which can be expressed by 
𝑃 = 𝑝 +  𝑝𝑁 and consequently,  
  𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑛
= 𝑝 > 0 (5) 
Proposition (5) should be positively correlated with the probability that a migrant finds 
employment, caeteris paribus.  
The second testable implication of interest from our model is obtained by applying the 
implicit function theorem to equation (4), which yields 
 𝜕𝑤𝑅
𝜕𝑛
> 0 (6) 
Expression (6) predicts that an increase in the network size will be associated with a 
higher reservation wage. As an individual receives more job offers, he will become more 
selective, increasing his reservation wage and therefore the accepted wage – a proposition that 
we will take to the data. 
The theoretical model presented above provides a formal insight on the mechanics behind 
a positive impact of social networks on immigrants’ employment status and wages. These are 
the two main predictions we test and find empirical support for. 
4. Econometric Framework and Identification Strategy  
 
4.1. Linear Probability Model (LPM) estimation 




size can be expressed as:  
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑁𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 
where 𝑌𝑖 is a binary variable that takes the values 0 or 1; 𝑁𝑖 stands for the individual network 
size; 𝑋𝑖 is a set of observable individual characteristics such as age, years of schooling, 
gender, years in Ireland, marital status or country of origin; and 𝜀𝑖 is the unobservable error 
term. 
To identify our parameters of interest, we initially estimated (7) using a Linear Probability 
Model (LPM).3 The main coefficient of interest, 𝛽1, produces consistent estimates conditional 
on the assumption that the error term is not correlated with the network size. However, such 
assumption is rather strong even after controlling for many observable characteristics. It is 
likely that unobservable characteristics may simultaneously determine the network size and 
the labor market outcome of a given individual. For instance, people with more contacts may 
have a better performance on the labor market not exclusively due to the fact that they have 
more access to information, but also because their unobserved ability is simultaneously 
correlated with the number of contacts they have and their professional achievements. The use 
of an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach may enable us to overcome this endogeneity 
problem and reestablish the consistency of the results. 
4.3 Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates 
The causal effect of the migrant network size on his/her subsequent labor market outcome 
can be obtained by performing an instrumental variable estimation. The estimation model is in 
this case given by (8): 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑁𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 
𝑁𝑖 = 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑆𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖 
                                                          
3 Note that we use the LPM when the outcome variable is the probability of being employed, of having a 
certain occupation, or of holding a certain type of job contract. For the wage equation, we employ an OLS 
model, which basically follows the same procedure, differing only in the interpretation of the coefficients. 
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where 𝑆𝑖 represents the instrument for the network size. Such instrumental variable must be 
strongly correlated with the network size, but not correlated with the error term. 
Instrumental variables are widely used in the empirical literature on social networks to 
ensure estimation consistency. Several authors have used historical networks, proxied by the 
stock of immigrants a decade prior to the year of the study, as an IV (see, for example, Patel 
and Vella 2007; Cortes, 2008). As our data was collected in 2010, we employ the stock of 
immigrants in Ireland in 2000 for every country in sample to construct our instrument4. In 
order to introduce individual variation and to correct for possible economic disparities 
between countries that may affect migration flows, we compute the instrumented size of the 





where 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 is the stock of immigrants in Ireland in the year 2000; 𝑔 stands for the 
immigrant’s country of birth; GDPpc PPP represents the per capita Gross Domestic Product 
in Purchasing Power Parities; and 𝑡 corresponds to the year of arrival in Ireland of immigrant 
𝑖.5 
We confirm in our data that the size of the individual’s network is correlated with the 
stock of immigrants, regardless of the fact that our main definition of networks includes 
migrants and non-migrants from a variety of countries, as long as they participate in the labor 
market. It is important to note that the majority of the individuals in the network are in fact 
immigrants coming from the same country (69.43%). The remainder comprises Irish-born 
individuals (16.46%) and migrants born in a different country than the respondent (14.11%). 
4.3 Heckit and IV-Heckit Models 
Although the IV approach is useful to correct for the endogeneity problems described 
                                                          
4 Data for the stock of migrants was made available by the United Nation, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs for the years 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2013. 
5 This approach has also been widely used in the literature. See, for example, McKenzie and Rapaport (2010) 





before, it cannot deal with other sources of bias - namely that caused by sample selection. 
Indeed, when the dependent variable is the monthly wage, and given the fact that our sample 
includes individuals that were not working at the time the survey was conducted, sample 
selection bias may arise. Once a migrant arrived in the destination country he can choose 
whether to work or not. For instance, some migrants choose to stay at home with their family, 
while others are still pursuing their studies. If such decisions were randomly made, selection 
bias would not be a problem and we could proceed with the OLS and IV estimations. 
However, unobserved factors may be operating a selection mechanism: the decision of 
entering the labor market may be correlated with a certain type of omitted characteristics that 
also influence the performance of the migrant on the labor market. Thus, sample selection 
bias will lead to inconsistent estimations.  
To overcome this problem, we estimate the sample selection correction procedure 
suggested by Heckman (1979), usually known as Heckit, that allows to not only test for 
sample selection bias, but also to obtain consistent estimates. Then, we further combine the 
Heckit and IV approaches to simultaneously deal with the two types of endogeneity described 
above. In what follows, we present the models used to estimate Heckit and IV-Heckit models. 
A sample selection model is specified by two equations: an observation or regression 
equation and a selection equation. The first equation considers the mechanisms determining 
wages: 
  𝑤1 = 𝛼1𝑁1 + 𝒛1𝜹1 + 𝑢1 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝑦2 = 1 
where 𝑤1 is a latent endogenous variable representing the monthly net wage; 𝑁1 stands for the 
network size and 𝜹1 is the vector of other explanatory variables such as age, gender, years in 
Ireland, years of schooling and marital status. 
The second equation, known as the selection equation, considers a proportion of the 





1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦2∗ > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦2∗ ≤ 0
 
𝑦2∗ = 𝜹2𝒙 +  𝑣2  
where 𝜹2 represents the set of explanatory variable determining the decision of working6. 
Note that the selection equation (10) specifies that wages are only observed for those migrants 
whose market wage is greater than zero. That is, they are only considered to be working if 
their wage is above a threshold value. A zero value in the equation means that the market 
wage of migrants is greater than their reservation wage (w>w*).7 
For the case of the endogeneity of the main explanatory variable, the IV-Heckit model, we 
introduce the reduced-form equation for the network size, 𝑁1 , where 𝜹3 represents the 
instrument8: 
𝑁1 = 𝒛𝜹3 +  𝑣3 
Heckman (1979) developed a two-stage procedure that allows one to consistently estimate 
𝜷1. In the first step, using all observations, i.e., the migrants for whom we observe wages or 
not, a probit model is estimated representing the decision to work: (𝑦2𝑖 = 1|𝒙𝑖) =  Φ(𝒙𝑖𝜹2). 
Then, based on the parameter estimated 𝛿2, the inverse Mills ratio for each observation is 
computed. The second step is to use the selected sample, i.e. working migrants, and fit an 
OLS regression for wages, including the inverse Mills ratio as an explanatory variable: 𝑦1 =
 𝒙1𝜷1 + 𝛾1𝜆(𝒙?̂?2)  + 𝜍𝑖. By including the Mills ratio, 𝜆(𝒙?̂?2), as an additional explanatory 
variable we correct the sample selection problem. For this reason, if the inverted Mills is 
statistically significant, we can conclude for selectivity bias. 
                                                          
6 We acknowledge the fact that some working migrants did not report their wage. In our methodological 
approach, we estimated the regressions including and excluding them from the sample and the significance of 
the main explanatory variable remained unchanged. For that reason, we present our results including the 
whole sample of immigrants. 
7 The Heckit model assumes that: (i) (𝒙, 𝑦2) are always observed; (iii) (𝑢1, 𝑣2) is independent of 𝒙 with zero 
mean; (iii) 𝑢1 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎); (iv) 𝑣2 ~ 𝑁(0,1); (v) 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑢1, 𝑣2) =  𝜌; and (vi) 𝑢1 and 𝑣2 are error terms of the two 
regression equations, assumed to be bivariate and normally distributed. 
8 The IV-Heckit model incorporates both the assumptions mentioned before and the assumptions of the 
instrumental variable approach – valid and relevant instruments. 
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In the case of the IV-Heckit, we follow the procedure as explained in Wooldridge (2002). 
In the first step, we estimate a probit model for the likelihood of the migrant working, 
whereas we include the exogenous explanatory variables, the exclusion restrictions and the 
instrument. This will give us estimates for 𝛿3; we then compute the inverse Mills ratio for 
each observation. In the second step, we use the selected subsample and estimate 𝑦1 =
 𝒛1𝜹1 +  𝛼1𝑦2 +  𝛾1?̂?𝑖3 + 𝑒1 by 2SLS using instruments (𝒛, ?̂?𝑖3). 
It is important to introduce exclusion restrictions to distinguish a sample selection from a 
misspecified model (Wooldridge 2002; Cameron and Trivedi 2005). They should have a high 
impact on the probability of the migrant entering the labor market but not be included in the 
outcome equation. Note that if we only had one exclusion restriction, in the case of the IV-
Heckit model, predicted 𝑦2 would be nearly collinear with 𝒛1 and ?̂?𝑖3. For that reason, we 
include at least two exclusion restrictions in our estimation models. We use the household 
income not earned by the respondent and a dummy variable for whether the respondent has a 
child as the two determinant variables influencing the probability of the migrant entering the 
labor market. 
 
5. Data: context, description and descriptive statistics 
This section describes the dataset used and its main descriptive statistics. 
5.1. Data Collection 
The database employed in this study was collected in the greater Dublin area, between 
February 2010 and December 2011, as part of a larger experimental project on migration and 
information flows led by a team of researchers at Trinity College Dublin9. The data we use 
consists of the baseline survey conducted among 1500 eligible individuals, including detailed 
information of the respondents and their networks. To be part of the project, the respondent 
                                                          
9 For more details regarding the project, see Batista and Narciso (2013). 
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had to fulfill the following requirements: 1) be 18 years old or older; 2) not Irish or British 
born10; 3) have arrived in Ireland between 2000 and six months prior to the interview date; 
and 4) not an Irish or British citizen. The random sampling procedure followed three steps: 
first, 100 Enumeration Areas (EA) were randomly selected out of the 323 Electoral Districts. 
Second, 15 households were chosen within each EA. Finally, if the household had more than 
one member eligible to take part in the survey, the individual respondent was randomly 
selected based on a next-birthday rule. Due to missing relevant information about eligibility 
for nine respondents, the final number of immigrants included in the sample is 1,491. 
5.2. Defining Network Size 
In order to estimate the effect of the network size on wages in the context of migration 
one first needs to define the network size for each immigrant. We follow (Patel and Vella, 
2007) and include in the network the individuals that were working at the time the survey was 
conducted, and therefore were more able to provide inside information about the labor 
market11. 
We use three different questions in the survey to cover all the contacts of the immigrants 
in Ireland. The first one concerns the composition of the household members of the 
respondent12: “Please indicate all the persons who belong to this household”. The second 
question concerns the contacts who the respondent knew living in Ireland before he had 
moved to the country: “Before coming to Ireland, how many people did you know who were 
already living in Ireland (at the time you moved)”?13; The third question includes the contacts 
living in Ireland whom, at the time of the survey, the migrant had most contact with: 
                                                          
10 As reported in Batista and Narciso (2013), “British citizens were excluded due to the close historical ties 
between Ireland and Great Britain.” 
11 We also tested network definitions including individuals that were not working. However, we obtained 
weaker results, which suggests that labor market information is shared by those who are insiders in the labor 
market.  
12 Household members are defined as those who usually sleep and eat in the same unit. 
13 People belonging to the same household are excluded from this question. We decided to include these 
contacts once they may have been an important channel of information to the migrants both before and after 
the migration process.   
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“Currently, who are the people (excluding people you live with or people you knew before 
coming to Ireland) that you have most contact with in Ireland?”. Using this information we 
are able to observe the size of the representative network for each migrant. 
5.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 includes the main descriptive statistics about the migrants’ characteristics. The 
first variable corresponds to the current monthly net wages expressed in euros. As we can 
observe, only 957 respondents reported a positive wage14. Our data indicates that around 63% 
of the individuals reported to be working as their main occupation. The size of the migrant 
network is the explanatory variable of main interest. Network size is a discrete variable that 
assumes values between 1 and 12 in our data. The average number of people in the network is 
approximately three.  
The sample is made up of a highly educated class of migrants who had, on average, 15 
years of education, which roughly corresponds to a Bachelor’s degree. The average age is 
approximately 33 years old. The average number of immigrants per country is 10004. Finally, 
the average monthly household income, excluding the respondent’s, is 1128 euros and around 
46.5% of the immigrants have a child.15 
6. Results  
6.1. Employment 
The theoretical model proposed in section 3 predicts that the size of the network is 
positively correlated with the probability of the immigrant being employed. Table 2 presents 
the empirical analysis of this prediction. Employed is a binary variable that assumes value 1 if 
                                                          
14 Those individuals for whom we did not observe a positive wage have the following occupations: unpaid 
housework, student, retired and unemployed or are not allowed to work due to visa issues. 
15 The supplementary appendix includes Table A.1. which shows the distribution of foreign-born individuals in 
the sample by continent and Table A.1., a description of the distribution of the top nationalities. 
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the individual is employed and value 0 if otherwise16. We start by using the LPM to study the 
relationship between the employment status and our main variable of interest, network size17. 
The results indicate that having one more person in the network is associated with an 
increase of 3 percentage points (pp) in the probability of being employed – an estimate 
significant at the 1% significance level. Moreover, females are less likely to be employed 
compared to males, as the gender coefficient is negative and highly significant. Being more 
educated is also positively correlated with employment, one more year of school increases the 
probability of being employed by 1.3 pp. Age and age squared are also strong determinants of 
the probability of being employed, although inversely related. As the immigrant gets older, he 
is less likely to be employed. Interestingly, the number of years since migration does not seem 
to influence the employment. The same holds true for marital status.  
The results are robust once endogeneity concerns are accounted for. The network size 
effect becomes higher in magnitude suggesting that having one more contact in the network 
increases the probability of being employed by 11.3 pp and remains positive and significant at 
the 10% level.  Our instrumental variable seems to be valid as it passes the weak 
identification test: the Cragg-Donald Wald F test presented in the end of the table is 12.249 
implying a strong association between the stock of immigrants and the number of contacts in 
the network size.18  
These empirical results therefore lend empirical support to the first testable implication of 
our theoretical model. 
6.2. Wages 
                                                          
16 We consider as employed individuals who reported to be working as the main occupation.  
17 Table A.4. of the supplementary appendix includes the Probit estimations whose sign, significance and 
magnitude are similar to the LPM estimations. 
18 Staiger and Stock (1997) indicate that, for the case of a single endogenous regressor, the instrument is strong 
if it passes the threshold of 10 in the first-stage F-statistic. 
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The second main prediction of our theoretical model is that individuals’ wages are a 
positive function of the size of the informal network. To empirically test this hypothesis, we 
employ three different models: OLS, Heckit and IV-Heckit.  
The estimated coefficients and respective standard errors are presented in Table 4. 
Monthly wage appears in the logarithmic form given the skewness present in the variable 
(1.9318, a considerable right-hand skewness).  
We begin our analysis by introducing the OLS estimation results (Column 1). Network 
size is statistically significant at the 5% level with a coefficient of 0.0260. That is, having one 
more person in the network size is associated with a 2.60 percent increase in wages. 
Individual’s gender does not seem to be correlated with the salary earned by the migrant. The 
coefficient is negative (suggesting that, on average, females tend to receive less than males), 
although it is not significant. Moreover, the number of years of schooling is positively 
correlated with the wages earned. One more year in school is associated with a 2.14 pp 
increase in wages, a result significant at the 10% level. The number of years in Ireland since 
migration, is also an important positive determinant of wages, indicative of the presence of a 
process of acquisition of human capital in the host country. Age and age squared are not 
correlated with wages in the OLS regression. Finally, married immigrants do not earn more 
on average compared with other marital status. In addition to the main individual 
characteristics explaining wages, namely gender, years of schooling, years in Ireland, marital 
status, age and continent fixed effects, we include further controls that may also potentially 
affecting wages, to increase the comparability of the different estimation models we use. 
Although the OLS estimator allows one to have a first insight on the relation between 
network size and wages, it may yield biased estimates as sample selection and other 
endogeneity concerns might be active in our sample. To test and correct for the hypothesis of 
sample selection, we employ a Heckman selection model, included in the second column of 
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Table 4. The inverse Mills ratio representing the latent selection factor is negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that having a child and a higher household income is 
negatively correlated with the probability of entering the labor market. We can conclude that 
there is a selection bias on unobserved characteristics that turns the sample of those migrants 
for whom we observe wages different from the remaining ones. Considering that unobserved 
characteristics of the immigrants reflect their unobserved ability, the Heckit estimate of 
network effects reveals that column (1) overestimated the network effects of less able people 
who gain more from the informal channels. A brief reflection on why less able people take 
more advantage from their networks leads us to consider that lower earning-ability migrants 
may be relying more on their social network as they find it more difficult to acquire jobs 
through formal methods.  
Comparing the OLS with the Heckit estimates, we can see that when we take into 
account selection in the decision of working on unobserved ability, the network effect is still 
significant at the 10% level and our main coefficient of interest is now 0.0196, lower than the 
OLS estimate. After correcting for sample selection, age and age squared become significant 
in opposite directions. While age is positively related with the migrants’ wages, age squared 
influences wages in a negative way. This implies a diminishing marginal effect of age, i.e., as 
the migrant gets older, the effect of age on wages lessens. This result is robust to the IV-
Heckit model. All the other coefficient estimates remain similar to the OLS model. 
Column 3 presents the results of the Heckit model with the network size instrumented, 
our IV-Heckit model. After controlling for endogeneity, we obtain our best estimate of the 
causal effect of networks on wages, which is still positive and significant at the 10% level. 
Having one more person in the network is associated with an increase of 6.46 percent in 
wages. This result suggests that both the OLS and Heckit model underestimate the effects of 
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network size. Our instrumental variable is significant and valid with a first-stage F value of 
20.845.  
IV-Heckit results are more robust when compared to the other two models, as it 
simultaneously deals with the two main sources of potential estimation biases in our empirical 
analysis. Nevertheless, the robustness of our main coefficient of interest in the three models 
provides clear evidence that the size of migrant social networks has a positive impact on labor 
market outcomes. Table A.3. of the supplementary appendix presents the first-stage 
regressions of the Heckit and IV-Heckit models. 
6.3. Occupational Choice and Job Security 
In addition to employment and wages, we also examine the impact of network size on 
other labor market outcomes, namely occupational choice and job security. 
As mentioned in Patel and Vella (2007) and Kerr and Mandorff (2015), immigrants tend 
to choose the same occupations as immigrants from the same background, and therefore 
migrants belonging to the same network may enjoy a large market power in some given 
sectors of the economy. In our empirical analysis we test if having more contacts can 
influence individuals to choose a certain type of occupation. Tables 4 to 6 include the 
estimations of the immigrants’ main occupations. Our data rules out the hypothesis that 
having more contacts can influence migrants to choose a certain occupation over the other 
ones, as the significance of the results is not robust to endogeneity or to the inclusion of 
continent fixed effects in the regression. However, the results suggest some evidence of a 
possible effect related with low-skilled jobs (Table 4) for which the coefficients are 
significant if we not account for continent fixed effects and remains positive in four 
equations. 
In what concerns job security, i.e., the employment stability offered by the type of 
contract, we examine the probability of having a certain type of job contract when the 
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network size is larger. Table 7 presents the results for the different types of job contracts: 
permanent, temporary, no contract or even self-employment.  
We find weak evidence that network size is correlated with permanent and temporary 
contracts or of being self-employed. Evidence is stronger for individuals who do not have any 
employment contract. Interestingly, networks seem to lead immigrants to other types of job 
situation rather than jobs with no contract as the coefficient is significant and negative. This 
is, having one more contact decreases the probability of having a job with no contract by 17 
pp. For this reason, networks seem to play an important role in decreasing precarious work. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examined the impact of larger network sizes on immigrant’s wages, probability 
of being employed, occupational choice and job security. We find evidence that having one 
more contact in the host country’s labor market is associated with an increase of 11pp in the 
probability of being employed and with an increase of about 100 euros in the average salary. 
However, the evidence related to the impact of networks on job security and occupational 
choice is rather weak or non-existent. Expanding the previous findings in the literature that 
have been mainly focused on developing countries, this study concludes that networks are 
also important to migrants in developed countries. Information flows can play an important 
role for immigrants in a new labor market, a central conclusion for policy makers who wish to 
create better migration experiences.  
Our results may reflect demand and supply influences in the labor market. On the demand 
side, employers wanting to reduce their screening costs will employ immigrants based on 
referrals or, if they are satisfied with the performance of a certain type of workers, they are 
more likely to hire people from the same background. From the supply perspective, upon 
arriving in the host country, most immigrants are still seeking for job opportunities (as our 
data suggests, only 13.48% of them had already a job offer when they moved to Ireland). If 
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individuals are in contact with more people who are employed, it is likely that they will have 
better information about opportunities in the job market. Although we are not able to 
disentangle such possible mechanisms in our paper, they provide an interesting topic for 
future research. 
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Continent Fixed Effects YES YES 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. 
 Main Dependent Variables 
Monthly net wage (euros) 957 1665 987.9 10500 100 
Employed (dummy) 1481 0.627 0.484 1 0 
 Main Independent Variables 
Network Size 1280 3.077 2.165 12 1 
Female (dummy) 1491 0.541 0.498 1 0 
Years of schooling 1483 14.69 2.798 17 0 
Years in Ireland 1489 5.348 2.863 11 0 
Married (dummy) 1491 0.424 0.494 1 0 
Age  1491 32.59 8.025 72 18 
 Instrumental Variable 
Stock of immigrants in Ireland (year 2000) 1485 10004 12919 44633 2 
 Exclusion Restrictions 
Monthly Household Income (euros) 1077 1128 1746 17500 0 
Having children (dummy) 1491 0.465 0.499 1 0 
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Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  12.249 
N 1272 1265 












































Married 0.028 0.0559 0.0754 
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Table 3: Log monthly wage as the dependent variable 
 
Table 5: Health sector occupation as the binary dependent variable 
 
Table 4: Agriculture, Industry and Construction sectors as the binary dependent variable 
 
Standard errors clustered at the Enumeration Area level in equation (1). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Other individual 
characteristics include religion and motive to migrate dummies. Labor market controls include the type of job contract and 




Standard errors clustered at the Enumeration Area level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual 




Standard errors clustered at the Enumeration Area level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual 
characteristics include gender dummy variable, years of schooling, years in Ireland, age, age squared and married dummy 
variable.  
 







Continent Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Other individuals characteristics YES YES YES 
Labor Market Controls YES YES YES 




Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic   20.845 

























Individual Characteristics YES YES YES YES 
Continent Fixed Effects YES NO YES NO 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic   12.321 65.054 



























Individual Characteristics YES YES YES YES 
Continent Fixed Effects YES NO YES NO 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic   12.321 65.054 
N 1267 1267 1240 1240 
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Table 7: Type of job contract as the binary dependent variables 
Table 6: IT sector as the binary dependent variable 
Table A.1.: Distribution of foreign-born 
individuals in the sample by continent 
 






























Individual Characteristics YES YES YES YES 
Continent Fixed Effects YES NO YES NO 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic   12.321 65.054 
N 1267 1267 1240 1240 
Standard errors clustered at the Enumeration Area level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual 
characteristics include gender dummy variable, years of schooling, years in Ireland, age, age squared and married dummy 
variable.  
 



































































YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Continent Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic 
 10.855  10.855  10.855  10.855 
N 1111 1086 1111 1086 1111 1086 1111 1086 
Standard errors clustered at the Enumeration Area level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual 
characteristics include gender dummy variable, years of schooling, years in Ireland, age, age squared and married dummy  
 
 
Continent Frequency Percentage 
Europe 655 43.93% 
Africa 483 32.39% 
Asia 247 16.57% 
Oceania 72 4.83% 
South America 26 1.74% 
North America 8 0.54% 
Total 1491 100% 
Country of origin Frequency Percentage 
Nigeria 291 19.52% 
Poland 162 10.87% 
India 91 6.10% 
South Africa 72 4.83% 
Romania 63 4.23% 
Brazil 54 3.62% 
Phillipines 46 3.09% 
Total number of countries 110 
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Table A.4.: Employment as the dependent variable 
Table A.3.: Heckman and IV-Heckman’s first stage regressions 
 
 


























































































Continent Fixed Effects YES YES 
Other individuals characteristics YES YES 
Labor Market Controls YES YES 












Continent Fixed Effects YES YES 
N 1272 1265 
Linear Probability Model in column (1), Probit, average marginal effects, in column (2). Standard errors clustered at the 
Enumeration Area level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
